

CHAPTER X

THE ANTI-NATURAL IDEOLOGY

Definitions are always risky business, but we could say that communism is the social and political system devised by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels which is particularly characterized by the negation of the right to property and by a materialist philosophy with special features. Marx distinguished himself primarily by his study of economics and what we might call historical materialism, while Engels is more identified with dialectic materialism. Communism shares many precepts with socialism, but exhibits greater coherence both in its cosmivision and in its praxis. Here we will encompass the fundamental aspects which characterize the former, and which everyone has to know in the defense of the nomocratic political axis of life.

The serious flaws of Marxism soon led to the appearance of *revisionist* tendencies, Bernstein¹, for example, and critiques such as those of Max Weber, who maintained that the ideas generated the systems: thus, Protestantism would have given rise to capitalism and not the other way around. Leaving aside whether or not that is correct, Weber had a better appreciation of social dynamics than Marx. He believed that nationalism was a more influential factor than class struggle in war and in the development of states, and that social stratification was determined not only by economic achievement but by concepts of honor and prestige as well. Another theorist, Vilfredo Pareto, saw the struggle as one not between an elite and the masses but rather between established and rising elites. The reasoning of Hegel led to the emergence of two important factions, the Hegelian right and left. The latter, even then sheltering left-wing intellectuals, anarchists and theologians, misinterpreted his words.

Hegelian *pantheism* was equated with an atheist position, a forced equalization, given that only when atheism admits the existence of ontologically superior planes of Being—with a concomitant assumption of a reverential attitude toward such planes—can it be said to resemble pantheism.

According to Engels, the commandment *Thou shalt not steal* must arise from the existence of private property.² True, but that only demonstrates its immemorial validity. And establishing communal property and distributing the daily bread equally to everyone are not enough to prevent its theft. Engels is right in that in a society where all the reasons for stealing have been abolished it would be crazy to do so. But when men steal, they look for a good which can satisfy their needs or wants, irrespectively of the legal status of such a good. Theft is not justified even in the presence of misery and injustice, and is at best perhaps viewed with understanding eyes. Of course, taking by force what one should be entitled to cannot be equated to stealing.

Communism is the anti-individualist philosophy par excellence, even though in practice it contradicts itself by awarding some (in an institutionalized manner) an illegitimate status. Within this matter, the natural resources of a nation are comparable to the natural abilities of an individual, so logical consistency would dictate that they could not be used for private gain. Justifying a relatively wealthy Russia alongside a China in want on the basis that they are independent economic units, is a capitalist way of reasoning, and shows the difficulty in universalizing the communist tenets. For Proudhon, on his part, enemy of property though he was, the community falls into the same contradictions as other epochs of the economy, and communism will inevitably end in iniquity and misery.³

To Engels, work is dehumanized by the division of labor, and he deemed it beneficial for engineers to push wheelbarrows. That is a wrong application of energy, leading only to inefficiency and waste; we can hardly imagine a former Soviet nuclear engineer engaged in such a task, since even communists themselves have realized that the division of labor increases productivity. Yet that is what occurred in Cuba when doctors were ordered to the fields to harvest cane, obviously with the intention of humiliating them. It will be argued that

Engels referred to the old distribution of labor, which Marx defined as socially significant, implying a certain status. But what is socially significant in such division has never been based on the division of tasks, as horizontal differentiations do not imply an outstanding performance or creativity, which is what raises social status. And a task-related division of labor is inevitable, unless we choose to take on completely different duties every day of our lives. The goal of Marx and Engels is to discredit the fruits of personal effort, attributing the natural stratification of society to the institutionalization of an exploitative mechanism. But the division of labor adapts to the needs of the time and matches the talents and abilities of each group. And even if it were the case that there was only one labor to be performed, it would not be performed equally by everyone, thus determining different recognition for each one, and thus also turning out to be socially significant.

According to Engels, division of labor allowed urban areas to dominate rural ones economically.⁴ Indeed, it has happened that urban production has been more highly valued by reason of its elaborateness and consumer's priorities; but it may well come to pass that the farms dominate the cities economically if foodstuffs grow scarce. The division of labor does not have an institutional mechanism of its own to force a people into submission. The separation country-city arrived naturally as both complement one another in order to satisfy the needs of a complex society. Cities are also powerful manifestations of the culture of a people. They facilitate research and industry, information gathering, and the diffusion of ideas.

Pessimists believe that things control men: the means of production do so, everything does so. They are right only in that few men think for themselves. And until they do so, it will make no difference who or what controls them; whether it be urban life, the means of production, or Marxism-Leninism. At bottom, no system of life is truly external to men since it is according to his nature that man creates moral and immoral systems, or, what is more common, that he alienates himself by choosing the anti-natural ones. Engels concludes that when the means of production are in private hands they control man, not so when they are in the hands of the state. In practice, however, it has become evident that placing the means of

production in the hands of individuals favors the attainment of greater freedom and fulfillment. Also, the means of production change especially through inventions, not precisely when the economic situation demands it. Bertrand Russell deems the Marxist perspective anti-historical: Marxist analysis cannot explain why such means did not change from Archimedes to Leonardo despite the need. Russell sees the lack of experimental science throughout that long period as the overriding factor. As he pointedly notes, intellectual causation of economic processes escaped Marx.⁵ Or rather, he had to hide such a fact, for what follows is the recognition of the merit of intellectual causation.

After Marx and Engels—who saw in the transformation of products into merchandises (and values) a negation of social production—neo-Marxists say that the social determination of material existence is negated “because of the separation of the units of production and of consumption”, which would be bridged through the value-form of products and work. But it is clear that such social determination is a concretization of cosmovision,⁶ which whenever belongs in the nomocratic axis deems direct distribution as contrary to right, and that the value-form of products and work—as we will see better in chapter XII—is praxis, not bridging of any sort of contradiction. In capitalist society the mentioned units are primarily integrated through the praxes of right, although for the purpose of distribution, only producers exist as essential juridico-economic units. But what has communism done in order to alleviate the abovementioned *evils*? Because in the communist world labor continues to be subdivided, hierarchies persist, cities remain, so does an official and alienating commodification of the human person. The practice of communism has undoubtedly dehumanized work.

The theory of reflection might be tolerable, but even if matter were supreme its reflections could not remain at the same ontological level than their mechanical referents. And if conscience reflects the objective world, it must also reflect ethical character. The crucial difference between communist materialism and some others is that the latter see man, though interacting with, autonomous vis-a-vis the environment thanks to his bio-cognitive processes—as Piaget

demonstrated quite convincingly—while the former believe that it is the means of production within society which determines the way we think. Along this line, Sartre defines ethics just as a reification of the negative structure brought by scarcity.⁷ This concept does not even merit encouraging struggles to change the modes of production and distribution, since, if that concept were true, all that can be achieved is another notion of justice possessing no more rationale than its own economic or material foundation. Scarcity is only a sub-emergent determinant upon whose interiorisation man builds bio-economic praxes. Ethics, on the contrary, reveals an irreducible disposition of the spirit; from the low evolved ones, leading to selfish appropriation and conflict, to social forms of legitimate possession and the transcendent ones, leading to brotherly sharing.

Marxist atheism is based among other things on substituting faith in oneself for faith in God. But faith in oneself is the same as faith in God for the believer, who does not see himself as alienated from the divine. The concept of the spirit held by Marx refers to a crass epiphenomenon of matter or identifies perhaps with the intellect. In the communist system, there is private religion, meaning that private religious practices will be tolerated, but the aim is to stem internal unrest, not to allow freedoms: since the state is atheist by definition, it has the right and the duty to combat the *opium of the people*. The assumption is that directed education and the subjection of the Church will suffice to erase all vestiges of religion or at least greatly weaken it in two or three generations. If religions served only to secure the entrenchment of certain classes in power, only fat politicians and despots could be found among their ministers. Purely philosophical theories would have never arisen, much less ascetics, mystics and saints. Undoubtedly there is something more . . . much more.

Historical and dialectical materialism

Dialectical materialism refers to inherent dialectical change as seen from a materialist angle, very craftily applied in this case to political concepts and to social life. Dialectical materialism, not cited by Marx in this form, took

some concepts from Hegel and applied them mainly to the historical process.

Our emphasis will thus be on historical materialism. Let us just stress the flawed nature of the law of the negation of the negation, in the sense that the abolition of private property overcomes in a synthesis the logical mutual dependency between the capitalist and the proletarian.⁸ Since both constitute dialectical poles, each one affirming itself and thus its rational pulls over property, what communists really *overcome* is the natural state of right. The only conceivable synthesis, justice, is through the above pulls. The abolition of private property is not synthesis but simply the anti-thesis of right. Although, as Marx correctly thought, there is a logical dependency—the *interpenetration of opposites*—between capitalist and proletarian, this actually lies in the existence of a wider whole, which can be any social system belonging in the nomocratic axis of life. As a socio-historical phenomenon, the capitalist/proletarian split arises in a production interaction; as a pure rational entity, that split is a praxical outcome, a doctrinal objectification. That is, that the existence of one does not depend so much on that of the other as it does on the existence of a code of right whose expression is particularized. And here, as a dialectical situation arises, the claims of each party (their emergent-level sphere), are intelligible only when integrated with those of the counterpart. But joint intelligibility does not mean joint legitimacy: the claims of one pole can be rejected, for example. According to the principles of nomocratic right, then, no possible interpenetration exists when it comes to the sources of right of capitalists and proletarians—which is precisely what legitimizes status—since these are self-substantive realities based on the actions of the individuals concerned. The dialectical moments of social dynamics corresponding to *pre-moral* and *axiological totalizations* may indeed entail a negation, not so much in the clash of wills over an object—which is more of a sub-emergent drive towards fulfillment—but in the sectorial perception of entitlements, so much, as we have said, that a rational solution cannot be relied upon, and an external agent of synthesis (the state) is required. In this case we can find another negation, that of irrational wills or contents. But it is clear here that the initial situation constitutes an incom-

plete dialectical event, which failed to produce a practical synthesis. In fact, had the principle of synthesis prevailed here, the dialectical event would have been completed through a single negation of illegitimate claims, if any, for a single occurrence. We do not discern here a formal disqualification of any polar notes as such, just misjudgments or arbitrariness by interested parties; and what is to be socially affirmed or negated is rationally affirmed or negated since the start. Patently, we cannot affirm any polar content disregarding its opposite, but this simply means that we cannot ignore the legal framework in which the situation takes place. There is no single thing, event or phenomenon in the whole universe whose full intelligibility can be attained acontextually.

Hegel believed that history moved forward according to dialectical law, which entails the conclusion that practically everything is preordained toward a higher end. That led Marx and Engels to assert that sooner or later communism—as the result of a transformation (quality) brought about by gradual changes in the social forces (quantity)—was bound to rule all over the planet. On that respect, we are tired of seeing retrogression as the outcome of political conflict. And a confrontation between the two great factions today could easily mean a return to barbarism or even the extinction of the human race. I agree that—disregarding the factor of external causation—we might understand each moment within a series by understanding the initial moment. What I do not accept is the proposed historical direction.⁹ Should the last communist regime finally be eradicated by the force of arms, what then? Would this mean that capitalism was the awaited synthesis? No philosophical truth will depend on who is better armed or better prepared for battle, unless we believe we are to witness the final struggle between good and evil. If it is given to dialectics to determine the purpose of history by means of a synthesis—such as the progress of the conscience of freedom, as Marcuse would say—the latter will not result from the abolition of social classes but from the legitimate realization of the individual in all his organic fullness.

To Marx, every society inexorably traverses certain stages, which are: primitive communism, the Asiatic way of production, feudalism, capitalism, and finally communism. According

to him, every society (with the exception of the first two and eventual communism) has been characterized by struggle between the classes because of the conflict between productive forces and production relationships. As we examine elsewhere, no dialectical situation can be conceived in such a manner. Now then, the prophesy of the inevitability of communism may materialize through the use of force, but the recent ferment in communist regimes—the breakdown of barriers to greater freedom of speech, movement and trade—shows that Marxism has failed to win the good will of the people, and is indeed an anti-natural ideology. Contemplating the Industrial Revolution and its initial shortcomings, it seemed inevitable to Marx that the dissatisfaction and extreme impoverishment of the proletarians in industrialized countries would bring about a revolution and their rise to power. Had Marx been less dogmatic, he might have realized that such situation had to be resolved, as in fact it was, without suppressing the particular social dialectical poles.

An important element of historical materialism is its concepts of the social structure. This assumes that economic organization constitutes the fundamental infrastructure, and that superstructures occur as legal forms of social coexistence which rise from the infrastructure. What this means in everyday language is that how a society is economically organized—especially in what concerns the production and distribution of necessary goods—will determine everything else in it, including religion, the arts, political thought, and so on. That leads to the conclusion that changing the economic infrastructure will change the other values which characterize a society or a culture. Marxist historicism forgets that history only shapes man in the measure that man has shaped history. But those were the concepts of the founders of communism in *The German Ideology*. It is there postulated that since primitive man had first to meet his material needs (such as food and shelter) in order to survive, the means to meet such needs must constitute the primordial factor of human history.

No, a thousand times no! The means for satisfying needs is not the subject of history, except within a general appreciation which is more the province of anthropology. History is a continuum of events determined by the forward march of time and

obeying various causal factors, the purely material among them. But historically significant events have much more to do with actions derived from ethical dispositions toward material conditions than with the conditions themselves. To Sartre," it would be scarcity the totalizer and the only possibility of history. But, in the same fashion, it is not scarcity, which is just a relation, but a drive towards fulfillment—the usefulness of a good remains even regardless of its availability—what prompts the actions which can be deemed historical. In normal conditions, scarcity acts as a determinant of distribution only through its effect on prices. Thus, it may be the totalizer of economic ensembles, but not of the legal frameworks that determine the legitimacy of distribution, save the emergency situations we have already mentioned. The milieu of scarcity within which social structures and institutions often arise is only circumstantial, as the latter are intelligible (and necessary) even amid the utmost and most comprehensive abundance. The milieu par excellence within which praxical structures and institutions arise, is reason.

Everything that is organized around the satisfaction of biological needs gives rise to an economic structure, which could be seen as a means to that end. But the activities destined to meet biological demands must be incorporated into a normative context, other social structures taking shape at the same time, not on the mere basis of organizing needs—if they are to secure a rational access to goods and social advantages—but of the global requirements of the human spirit. To derive superstructural elements, such as legal provisions, from a dialectical process lacking in moral contents—starting from the productive forces (or conditions of material production) and passing by the modes of production—is to pretend that sub-emergent realities can skip the evolutionary process, for which reason such contents must be incorporated in the infrastructure—initially in rudimentary forms of social organization with all probability derived from the familial model or right—to originate the advanced praxical mechanisms known as the superstructures. There is, then, side by side with every economic structure, a true ontological necessity subjecting it, especially the distribution patterns, to a framework of right, which is irreducible to material determinants and cannot be regressed to them. Law,

*In his previously mentioned *Critique*, pp.122 ff .

insofar as expresses an existential moment of the collective praxical self, is essentially autonomous from its external determinants. The material means of satisfying such needs are thus transcended by the ethical; the historical, then, originates rather in socio-ethical praxis.¹⁰

Customs are sources of right because most collective practices imply believing in their goodness, and therefore an unwritten law which endorses them. What is done later is merely to institutionalize or para-institutionalize them. In any case, the economic event does not by itself determine the power structure. Even further, it is the state (the power structure) which usually introduces, supports or alters economic structures. Of course, the system of production and distribution possesses autonomous (environmental-bound, that is) constitutive and functional spheres. But the state, as a primary structure of social order, has overriding powers over all the others, excepting the cultural one. The (political) ends pursued by every free society, and the means to achieve them, constitute less a design than a praxis mediated through the collective conscience. The ideas of Marx do not do justice to the great events which make up the human saga: the search for truth, the defense of the faith, ambition, and so on. Religions cannot be said to have originated under any particular economic system, and their tenets survive throughout history while also gaining hold in different economic strata.

A social system may be defined by the institutional and the institutionalized life of the people. Thus, it is quite true that when a system of life is established the new members born into it are educated in its values. But society can mold man only through man. Also, an ideology in conflict with an established social system is not necessarily the product of contradictions inherent to the system; it may simply rise as a result of unwarranted social discontent or even an innovative approach. The communist system itself originated and took hold precisely that way, generating a contradiction external to capitalism itself. As is to be expected, changing the economic structure will tend to alter the interdependent social variables. But it will not modify substantially any emergent-level structure or its praxis. Thus, people may hold on to their moral values through change after change in the economic structure.

Obviously, depending on the nature of the changes which are implanted, people will see some economic practices as just and others as unjust. Thus, in a feudal system justice will be a function of the amount demanded by the feudal lord, while no amount of an analogous tribute will be acceptable under capitalism, only a tax payable to the state. But that does not really mean that the moral superstructure has changed: man tends to adapt to the prevailing system, and applies moral values to those economic practices sanctioned by the system. More than the system of production and distribution itself, reflection on the essence of his being, his struggles, and similar considerations, shape the cosmivision of man and his social structure.

Marx asserted that every step of the development of production was related to a corresponding class structure. But such steps determine, more than anything, functional arrangements, while the fundamental structure of social class is determined by the prevailing framework of right. Such arrangements, it could be said, entail differences in status. Yes, but only through previous parameters of legitimacy. The same functional arrangements can determine different class structures and compositions depending on the prevailing ethos. And in a collectivized system, factors other than economic ones exclude the occurrence of social amorphousness. To Marx, every social system contained immanent forces leading to contradictions which could only be resolved by a new social system. Communism was the exception: in the absence of classes, these contradictions would disappear. Is the sprouting of democratic ideology in former communist regimes, then, evidence of the contradictions of the system? Political ideas are not determined merely on the basis of the social class one belongs to. We saw that in El Salvador where, despite circumstances of extreme social tension, the communists never gained the support of either the proletariat or the peasantry. Political ideas differ according to each fundamental disposition of spirit, but conviction subject to convenience does not deserve to be called ideology. The reasoning of the true philosopher and ideologue, or of any clear-thinking man, is, as far as his psycho-epistemological evolution permits it, above class prejudices, vested interests, and whatever is deemed

conventional at the time. Because even if thought were a totally goal-directed operation of the spirit, neither can we deny that there is in the latter an unadulterated aim to seek the truth. The fact that entrepreneurs generally lean to the right in their economic thinking is not a function of their social class, except in what applies to horizontality, that is, the type of industry. Because we cannot expect a prince to lack a leadership mentality, or a lawyer not to defend the interests of his profession. Most men possess a capitalist mentality, even if they belong to different social strata, since they value personal merit and demand recognition of their own. Only in tyrannical regimes is it impossible to defend guild interests because of the repression of the particular dialectic poles of right.

Hierarchic organization is inherent to the human species, and may even be shown to exist in animals. In man, this type of order is essential to institutionalization. Without it, there would only be chaos. Examples abound to show social classes working together in harmony. Dialectical antagonisms must rise between them, as well as between nations, cultures, and others, but their opposing interests must be univocally overcome in both poles. When interests are rational—and in the case we discuss here that usually relates to horizontal concerns—there can be no rationale for class struggle. The communist triumphs have been party, not class, victories. Communists attempt to provoke ideological antagonisms, but since only the abnormal become their recruits where there is no great injustice, they find it necessary to create chaos and misery, stir tensions, and spill blood. Where there is no dialectical struggle, it must be provoked.

Communism and the state

Evolution into civil society is unnecessary and harmful, according to Marx, since such a society asserts the right to property, a right he considers unjustified and leading to the subjection of certain classes. From expositions in the appropriate sections of this book, following prestigious studies, we know that never have rights or the law been absent from the social structure of man. Their manifestation may have been rudimentary, but the transition between the state of nature, if

we accept it occurs in organized human groups, and civil society is only one of degree. Marx argues, citing the 1793 Declaration of the Rights of Man, that since the right to property implies free will over the object of property, other men and society are left out.¹¹ I find it strange that he overlooks that such free will is not the privilege of a few but instead a universal right: men are alienated only from what they have not created. To Marx, rights divide rather than unite men, and argues that when men affirm them they do so in order to benefit their own private interests. This last may be so, but realizing legitimate interests projects to the common good. Law in civil society simply reflects that awareness.

When Jews demanded rights and freedoms (of worship, in this case), Marx replied that "...the point of view of political emancipation has the right to demand from Jews the abolition of Judaism, and from man the abolition of religion."¹² A Marxist, then, cannot be asked to recognize the freedom of anyone to exercise this or that right, because he will argue that freedom exists only in abolishing the rights one would exercise. Proletarians of the world, open your eyes! Even though *non-bourgeois* rights are offered to you today, tomorrow those same rights will be considered bourgeois and therefore denied to you!

But Marx dreams of a perfected political state within which spirituality will bloom because man will live in a political community as a communal being, whereas in civil societies he acts as a private individual. What defines a communal being, however, is his organic integration with the principles of society, not the reduction of the individual to the status of a bee. And property—in the *bourgeois* sense of the term—is a trans-historical institution whose criteria of legitimacy are above any particular wills over it. If we accept the reality of so-called primitive communism as conceived by the Marxists, we have there a communal being. Shall we therefore accept the social perfection of man in that state? We will later see that is not the case. Communal life must spring from spirituality, not the other way around! A genuine communal being is product of an organic, not of any aperticularizing synthesis.

In arguing against the Declaration, Marx asserts that enacting laws in order to defend rights is evidence of previous

conflict. Indeed, laws are enacted when the need is perceived. The argument, then, turns against him: when civil society was installed, that is, when a well-established political power and the need to legislate arose, that event must also evidence previous conflict, in this case in the stage of *primitive communism*. Lenin, following Engels, held the same opinion: that the state was a product of society, which had arisen because of a contradiction within the latter as a result of an irreconcilable conflict between the classes.¹³ But had the state been born in order to oppress the greater number, it would be logical—for those times—to assume that the few would have been subdued. That is evidence that the few ruled with the consent of society. A very strong objection to the oppressive theory of the origin of the state is to be found in the suggestion that generally the first established governments were not tyrannical. When tyrannical governments appear, the usurping class enters into conflict with the others, but it is not identifiable with all upper classes. Usurping classes are upper only in terms of power, not because they are outstanding or meritorious. Besides, many tyrannies have not been and are not today based on class, but rather on a chieftain, a party, a race, or a creed. When Engels cannot escape recognizing the existence of a tribal chief worthy of respect, he asserts that the roots of his power are not alien to society, and that in all other situations the state will act to repress the subjugated classes. But the fact is that the very existence of such chiefs speaks against the idea of a classless society, and that a class division by itself constitutes a structural mechanism of subjugation.

Neo-Marxist concepts have only worsen the picture. To Sartre, the state posits itself as a mediator between class struggle, and it may impose paternalistic policies on the dominant classes on behalf of the subjected ones, always in the best interests of the former.* Were he talking of deceiving, we might agree; but for him the above grounds in a formal scheme which finally reverts to the determinations exerted upon man by worked matter (*the practico-inert field*), which I plan to deal thoroughly with in my next book. Suffice here to say that any social scheme lacking in emergent-level determinants must explain such things as exploitation as an inertial drive, making

*Op. cit., pp.628 ff and 640.

impossible to prove it due to its lacking in the parameters of legitimacy we have mentioned. Neither political power nor sovereignty are intelligible in terms of appropriating and interiorising the powers of the dominant class and then transforming them into right, except within the realm of arbitrariness. Thus, only when the state mediates between the classes or individuals qua units of right, its power explains itself and becomes legitimate. The impotence of *series*—in short, alleged low-level forms of sociality such a fashion-related aggregates or even people lined up to buy tickets—to resist the manipulation of a dominant group, cannot explain the power of the state because sociality is not exhausted at the *serial* sphere. Manipulation works at the bio-psychological, not at the rational level. Even if hidden, there always co-exist in everyone higher spheres of sociality which are the ones that relate to legitimacy and consensus, fundamental to any objective notion of the state. Certainly, the state conforms itself from the dominant groups of society, but it will always do so from the *praxically normative sector* of society.

To Engels, the organization of individuals according to territory in a civil society is a repressive measure.¹⁴ This borders on paranoia. In smaller societies, everyone knows each other by name or by family affiliation, but in a larger one social tasks, distribution and services must be organized on the basis of the subjects' or citizens' residence for the sake of proper functioning and administration. In primitive societies, bonds between men are more determined by blood relationship because family and clan constitute the mainstays of their integrity. Territorial bonds are weaker because territorial limits may be poorly defined or temporary, and because in primitive stages cultural values are notably less rooted in the nation than in the family. In civil society blood relationships function on another level, but anything that brings man closer together is worthy of appreciation.

Even the bodies set up to maintain the public order are seen as tyrannical instruments of civil society.¹⁵ In primitive societies, police and judges were those who administered justice, because labor was not divided to the point that there were special bodies, nor were these needed. That was the case with the army, constituted mainly by those who were ready and

able to fight at a given moment. In a complex society, this would be absolutely anti-practical. Now then, it does not make sense to aver that there is in capitalism a public force separate from the people, since such a force is just a praxical mechanism of social order. It is necessary to demonstrate that the capitalist state requires the existence of a repressive force to maintain a society above society. And what is to be gained socially if, as Lenin proposes, the repressive forces of the bourgeoisie are substituted by those of the proletariat?¹⁶ As social classes—that is, with no further qualification—both proletarians and bourgeois can brandish only the constitutive support they provide society as a source of legal merit and justification for ruling. A genuine representativity of the people rests more on principles than on any sectors of the population. According to Engels, when the proletariat assumes power and transforms the means of production into state property, the state ceases to exist as such, class differences disappear, and so do slavery, wage earning, servitude, and all forms of coercion. Only its dialectical counterpart—the individual as an object of right—disappears here. And as to patch the contradiction between a class-bound state and a classless society, we are told that the state cannot disappear in one day, so it will vanish little by little. The *proletarian state*, that is; the bourgeois counterpart, on the contrary, is destroyed.¹⁷ It is all a matter of labels: one government substitutes another, that is all. We already know full well that the classes reorder themselves, and that the state begins, not to vanish, but to control over every aspect of human life, endeavoring to inculcate a spurious consciousness, a real society above society.

Even before the days of Marx, there were all kinds of anarchists, from the idealists or philosophers to the terrorists. But they all wanted to destroy established authority once and for all; they did not accept a proletarian state in its place. In that respect, anarchists were at least consistent. But even though communists have accused them of serving reactionary interests, there are more agreements than differences between them. Both see proletarian revolution as their goal, and both are enemies of property. Anarchists see themselves as such in regard to political power, and as communists in regard to property, a true contradiction. The state should no longer

exist in those countries still under communist rule, since there is supposedly no possibility for any remnants of the bourgeoisie to take over and social classes are not supposed to persist. The danger of external aggression is not a valid excuse, since *the people in arms* could defend themselves in the absence of the state.

The state becomes smaller only when its repressive actions are similar to those which the persons would rationally take against each other in comparable circumstances absent the state. The philosophy of individualism is rooted there. When the state vanishes, we are promised full democracy, which will eventually disappear, and ideal communism and universal happiness will take its place.¹⁸ What is promised is a Utopian Society of Ethical Men where the state will not be needed because all men will conduct themselves ethically. The road from capitalism to communism is supposed to traverse an intermediate stage called socialism or first phase of communist society, where there will be a collective ownership of the means of production and equality will be supreme. The implication is that rights would cease to exist because equality of rights presupposes inequality. But, in contradictory fashion, we are also granted that bourgeois right would not be completely abolished at this stage because society cannot abruptly begin to function without a standard of right.¹⁹ This seems an attempt to make use of bourgeois creativity for political and economic ends, as we witnessed in Sandinista Nicaragua. Conserving bourgeois right when the intent is to eliminate it, is what Lenin terms a dialectical puzzle of profound content. The fact is that even in the first phase of communism there is no genuine state of right, only an amoral legal standard according to which all community members are considered state employees. Thus, everyone will have to work equally, receive equal pay, and belong to a single syndicate directed by the power of the armed workers. This is actually a mechanism to achieve what neo-Marxists deem *homogenization through the interiorization of extra-economic power* in democracies, which negates the first principle of nomocratic right. What as a consequence takes place in a socialist scheme is a *periferic aparticularization* of right, which—given that it requires a centralization of all the

power—leads to the structural constitution of an oppressive social class.

To Lenin, capitalism “creates pre-requisites for everyone who would participate in the administration of the state.”²⁰ I would like to know when in history and where in the world have pre-requisites been unnecessary in order to direct any institution. In democracies, at least ideally, they measure honesty and ability; in communist countries, they certify party affiliation and faithfulness to orthodox ideology and praxis. In capitalist countries, these pre-requisites are said to be economic in character, dismissing the simple fact that while those who attain power usually do so after having also attained some measure of economic advancement, achievement in any field is generally accompanied by such advancement in those countries. But it is because some stand out in politics and not because they attain wealth that they achieve the privilege of leadership.

The next step is the highest phase or stage of communism, where the famous words of Marx are supposedly realized (“From each according to his ability and to each according to his need”²¹) and when the state no longer exists, which will arrive in who knows how long. As we have commented earlier, need is transformed into a usurper of natural rights to the detriment of everyone. Lenin predicts a great development of the productive forces at that time, to the degree that everyone will be able to take, without control, whatever goods he may need. This constitutes the perfected political state proposed by Marx (a la Hegel), one different from civil society. But while something similar is conceivable (although not necessary) in the Utopian Society of Ethical Men, that will arrive freely and in a different way, with a different mentality.

Given the developing circumstances, neo-Marxists (or *socialists*) have been forced to attempt to polish the basic doctrine in order to make it more presentable to ever more perspicacious audiences.²² The founders of communism, for example, did not beat around the bush, and clearly proposed abolishing the right to property. But today that sounds unattractive, to say the least, so anti-concepts are created which always end in violating that right, while attempting to lull us into believing a realistic conception of it is being actually defended. And, despite of all their practical failures, still they

ask us to wait perhaps a thousand years for the arrival of their paradise on earth while offering us only an intellectualized justification of the axis statism-aparticularization-usurpation today.

Notes

¹Eduard Bernstein argued for evolutionary instead of revolutionary movement, to wit his work *Evolutionary Socialism*. In addition to being the initiator of revisionism, Bernstein was the principal ideologue of the Social Democracy of his time.

²Engels, F., *Anti-Dühring*, Part I, Ch.VII, pp.209-210. Orbe, Editores y Distribuidores de Publicaciones, Havana 1961. Engels previously engaged in polemic with Dühring on matters of ethics because Dühring spoke of universal rules. Engels believed that morality varies according to circumstances; thus he referred to proletarian, bourgeois, and other moralities. We may not compare morality to science in every respect, by the way. Science is essentially the discoverer of ever newer concepts. Morality is atemporal; although as praxis is essentially historic, it stresses the methodological value of rediscovering the old. Science may deny something it previously asserted. Not so morality, at least not outside a praxical spectrum. Yet Engels concludes that everyone can admit and desire whatever he wants in these matters (Part I, Ch.VII, p.109). How is man then to find a reliable standard to guide and evaluate his conduct? All the while rejecting every attempt at imposition by Dühring, Engels would not hesitate to impose his proletarian criterion. He who accepts multiple moralities must also accept multiple truths, or at least multiple normative criteria.

³Proudhon, P. J., *Sistema de las contradicciones económicas o filosofía de la miseria*, Vol. II, Ch. XII. Biblioteca Júcar, Madrid 1975. It was this critique which prompted Marx to write *The Misery of Philosophy*.

⁴The thought of Engels on these matters may be found in several of his works, especially *Origen de la familia, la propiedad privada y el Estado* (Ch. IX, Barbarie y civilización, pp.181 and following. Editorial Mexicanos Unidos, S. A., México 1982). *Anti-Dühring* is also worth consulting on the matter: the assertion that the first great division of labor occurred between city and countryside can be found here (Part III, Ch.III, p.335).

⁵Russell, B., *Freedom versus Organization, 1814-1914*, Economic causation in history, pp. 197-200. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York 1934. Russell develops a brief but well-aimed critique of economic causation as the single factor in history. As must be evident, and paraphrasing him, history may be seen in many ways, and many general formulas may be invented which cover enough ground to seem adequate, if events are carefully selected. That is, we may postulate that climatic changes are at the root of all historical events, and find seemingly adequate examples linking cause and effect in a plausible manner. This, however, must not be taken as an impossibility for establishing objective criteria of causation, as Russell's philosophy is prone to do.

⁶Reuten, G., and Williams, M., *Science and Society*, Vol. 57, No. 4, p.426. Winter 1993-1994, New York, NY. Under capitalism, such units may act separately in pursuit of their own interests. But since they are jointly affirmed

units of right, and their wills univocally redressed, social determination is guaranteed in all the relevant contexts. More than the value-form of economic categories, what bridges their dialectical confrontation is justice. Under communism, the units are bound by negating the first principle of nomocratic right, that is, through aparcerization. Engels would say that in a commune products are distributed with regard to tradition and needs. He seems to forget that the term tradition already says a great deal. Traditions arise precisely from at least an intuition of something that is worth keeping. We cannot discuss tradition without serious consideration of the ethical values of a people, and therefore of the aspects of right.

⁷Sartre, J.F., *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, pp.132-134. Verso, London 1982.

⁸This is the basic formulation of the double negation, in which *individual private property* (IPP) is said to be negated by *capitalist private property* (CPP), which in turn generates its own negation and ends up being abolished. Marxist say that IPP will be restored (affirmative outcome) since they define it as *scattered* private property, exemplified in the state of nature and including communal property (CMP). But this may be private property only by standards of arbitrary grabbing or universal allotment. The genuine of IPP is CPP because it correlates with objective criteria for legitimate particularization. Historically, a far better outline seems CMP negating the so-called IPP (anarchic property for the most part perhaps), just to be substituted by CPP. Rationally, the negation of CPP is generated externally and is equivalent to usurpation. And the only thing that CPP organically denies is aparcerization. Of course, the historical display of the recognition of private property and its denial can show us multiple negations, but corresponding to multiple dialectical events.

⁹Marx, K. and Engels, F., *La ideologia alemana*, p.139. Editorial Vida Nueva, Buenos Aires 1958. The Messianic prediction of the inevitable advent of communism can be found also in the *Communist Party Manifesto*. "Communism," it states, "will be different from all previous revolutionary movements." It is a movement which sees itself as the end of history, when a single class will be formed, the proletariat, whose interests will not conflict in any way with those of the ruling class. Were the Soviet proletarians ever in agreement with the *Nomenklatura*?

¹⁰Given that economic activities or forms of human cooperation are framed within time, they must be the subject of history. But even the most simple economic structures constitute forms of social organization which include, even if in an unconscious manner, categories other than the mere economic ones. Consequently, the modes of production cannot determine the relations of production. The former are rather pure economic praxes: although they imply a division of labor, a hierarchy, and by extension a manner of distribution, such categories derive from the collective sense of justice, which is immediately intelligible only in the relations of production.

¹¹Marx, K., *The Portable Karl Marx*, "On the Jewish Question," p. 108. Penguin Books, New York 1983.

¹²Marx, K., *Ibid.*, p.106. Marx equates the political emancipation of the religious man in general with the emancipation of the state from religion in general, something that had already taken place.

¹³Lenin, V. I., *State and Revolution*, Ch.I, pp.8-9. International Publishers, New York 1983. Here he accuses socialists and Mensheviks of adapting to the petit bourgeois theory that the state could serve as a concil-

iator between the classes.

¹⁴Engels, F., *Origen de la familia, la propiedad privada y el Estado*, Ch.IX, p. 196. Editorial Mexicanos Unidos, S. A., México 1982.

¹⁵Engels, F. Ibid.

¹⁶Lenin, V. I., Ibid., Ch.I, p.17.

¹⁷Lenin, V. I., Ibid., Ch.I, 4. The Vanishing of the State and Violent Revolution, pp.15-20.

¹⁸Lenin, V. I., Ibid., Ch. V, 4. The Superior Phase of Communist Society.

¹⁹Lenin, V. I., Ibid., Ch.V, 3., p.78.

²⁰Lenin, V.I., Ibid., Ch.V, 4., p.83.

²¹Marx, K., *The Portable Karl Marx*, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," p.541. Penguin Books, New York 1983.

²²Others, as Reuten and Williams (Ibid., p.429 ff), assert that in capitalism the state acts, on the one hand, as a definer and upholder of *abstract* rights (principles), which demand the maintenance of the value-form of the economy, while on the other, it must intervene (welfare in a Capitalist Mixed Economy) to guarantee the reproduction of concrete rights (existence in particular), for which the state is separated from the economy and at the same time intervenes in it (*separation in unity*). If the reader needs more information on this, I advise him to turn to page 361. But it is apparent here that welfare, understood in the socialist way, is not a tool for bridging previous contradictions, but a contradiction itself of the principles of the system. In regard to legitimate subsidizing actions, they actually guarantee a genuine capitalist state of right as they relate to the formative support we all give to society.